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FEDERALISM, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, AND
THE REHNQUIST COURT IN ACTION*
Bernard Schwartzt

One of the broad themes in the Warren Court was nationalism. The Court
under Chief Justice Warren preferred national solutions to what it considered
national problems and, to secure such solutions, was willing to countenance
substantial growth in federal power. The Burger Court's approach to federalism
was more ambivalent. Its first important decision on the matter virtually revived
the state-rights doctrine, drastically restricting federal power in the process.'
That decision was, however, overruled toward the end of the Burger tenure,
with the Court pendulum swinging again in favor of federal authority.2
SEMINOLE TRIBE AND FEDERALISM

The Rehnquist Court has displayed no such ambivalence. Its first decision
on the subject struck down a federal law because it "commandeered" states into
enforcement of federal regulatory provisions.' Then, in 1995, United States v.
Lopez4 ruled for the first time in over half a century that a federal statute went
beyond the limits of the Commerce Clause. The Rehnquist trend continued this
past term with the decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,5 which
gives new scope to the state immunity from suit provided by the Eleventh
Amendment. In the case, a federal statute provided that an Indian tribe may
conduct certain gaming activities only under a compact between the tribe and
the state where gaming activities are located. The law, passed under the Indian
Commerce Clause,6 imposes upon the states a duty to negotiate in good faith
with an Indian tribe toward the formation of a compact and authorizes a tribe to

* Based on remarks delivered at the Conference, Practitioner'sGuide to the October 1995 Supreme
Court Term, at The University of Tulsa College of Law, December 6, 1996.
i Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law.

1. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
CONST.

See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995).
116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
"The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes." U.S.
art. I, § 8,cl.
3.
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bring suit in federal court against a state in order to compel performance of that
duty. The Court held that, "notwithstanding Congress' clear intent to abrogate
the States' sovereign immunity, the Indian Commerce Clause does not grant
Congress that power," and consequently the statute "cannot grant jurisdiction
over a state that does not consent to be sued."7 Therefore, the Seminole Tribe's
suit against Florida to compel it to negotiate in good faith for a tribal-state compact had to be dismissed. Under Seminole Tribe, state Eleventh Amendment
immunity from suit may be abrogated by Congress only under its power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.8
The 1989 Union Gas case9 had held that the Commerce Clause also gave
Congress the power to abrogate state immunity from suit; but Seminole Tribe
expressly overruled Union Gas."° The Eleventh Amendment stands for the
constitutional principle that state sovereign immunity limits the federal courts'
Article III jurisdiction. The bounds of Article III may not be expanded by Congress under any constitutional provision other than the Fourteenth Amendment.
Congress may do so under the Fourteenth Amendment because it was adopted
well after the Eleventh Amendment and the Constitution operated to alter the
pre-existing balance between state and federal power under both Article Ill and
the Eleventh Amendment. Except for the Fourteenth Amendment, Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit does not give way when the suit involves an
area, like regulation of Indian commerce, that is under exclusive federal control.
"The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article Ill, and
Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon
federal jurisdiction.""
Decisions in the lower federal courts indicate that Seminole Tribe may
have far-reaching impact upon suits brought against the States. Since Seminole
Tribe, it has been held, for example, that a suit alleging violation of the federal2
prohibition against age discrimination may not be brought against a State.1
And, even more striking, lower court cases hold that States may not be sued for
violations of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act. 3 If those cases are correct,
it may well be that Seminole Tribe, without expressly doing so, in practice
overrules the last important federalism decision of the Burger Court in the 1985
Garcia case,14 which held that the States could be subjected as employers to
the wage and hour requirements imposed by the Federal Fair Labor Standards
Act.
However, Seminole Tribe has even broader, and more disturbing, implications. The Seminole Tribe sought an injunction not only against the State of

7. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1119.
8. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1125 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Blitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976)).
9. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
10. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1128.
11. Id. at 1131-32.
12. See MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, 938 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Ala. 1996).
13. See Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203 (6th Cir. 1996); Adams v. Kansas, 934 F. Supp. 371 (D.
Kan. 1996).
14. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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Florida, but also its governor. In Ex parte Young,'" one of its seminal constitutional law decisions, the Court had held that an action against a state official to
enjoin official actions violating federal law was not a suit against the state
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Under Young, the state may be "free to
carry out its functions without judicial interference directed at the sovereign or
its agents, but this immunity from federal jurisdiction does not extend to individuals who act as officers"' 6 in violation of law. Under Young, the individual
has, in almost every case, a ready means of bringing an action against what is
actually the State, but formally only against the State official who is carrying
out the State law that is alleged to violate the Federal Constitution or provision
of federal law.
Seminole Tribe rejected the argument that, under Young, suit to enforce the
federal statute might be brought against the governor notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar. Young did not apply here because the
statute that imposed the duty to negotiate was passed in conjunction with a
carefully crafted and intricate remedial scheme: 7 "where Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a
statutorily created right, a court should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and permitting an action against a state officer based upon Ex parte
Young."" This reasoning is difficult to support logically since the detailed remedial scheme provided by Congress here was completely ineffective because
the Court held there could not be any action against the State. Nevertheless, the
Ninth Circuit has followed that limitation of the Young exception, saying that
Young applied unless Congress has, in the given statute, provided a detailed
remedial scheme for would be plaintiffs. 9
It is to be hoped, nevertheless, that Seminole Tribe's refusal to apply
Young will be limited to duties under statutes prescribing similar detailed remedial schemes. If, instead, it is meant to cast doubt upon the Young doctrine
itself, that could have most baneful consequences. The Young doctrine may be
only a "fiction,"' but it is "nothing short of 'indispensable to the establishment of constitutional government and the rule of law,""'2 since, without it, all
illegal state action would be immune from judicial review.

15. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
16. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1952).
17. The statute provided that if the court found that the state had failed to negotiate in good faith, it
could order the state and the tribe to conclude a compact within 60 days. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii)
(1994). If the parties failed to conclude a compact within that period, each party then had to submit a proposed compact to a mediator, who selects one of the compacts which was then to be enforced by regulations

of the Secretary of the Interior. See id. §§ 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv) to (vii).
18.
19.
20.
21.

Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1132.
NRDC v. California Dept. of Transp., 96 F.3d 420 (9th Cir. 1996).
Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1180 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. (quoting C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 292 (4th ed. 1983)).
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: LoVING AND SMILEY

The Rehnquist Court has been the most pro-executive and administrative
agency Court in over half a century. The two decisions now to be discussed Loving v. United States' and Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), NA.A - definitely continue that trend.
At issue in Loving was the delegation of authority to the President to prescribe aggravating factors that permit a court-martial to impose the death penalty upon a member of the armed forces convicted of murder. Under Furman v.
Georgia,' which concededly applied to the military capital punishment
scheme, court-martial members were required to "specifically identify the aggravating factors upon which they have relied in choosing to impose the death
penalty."' The President had issued an Executive Order providing that, before
a military death sentence may be imposed, at least one aggravating factor must
be present; it then enumerates 11 categories of aggravating factors sufficient for
imposition of the death penalty.' The Court held that Congress had delegated
to the President the authority to prescribe the aggravating factors in military
murder cases.' But petitioner claimed that the separation of powers requires
that Congress, not the President, make the "fundamental policy determination"
on the factors that warrant capital punishment.' In effect, the argument was
that Congress cannot delegate authority to prescribe aggravating factors: that
was a "core function" that Congress had to perform itself. Only Congress was
given the power "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval forces,"29 and the determination of aggravating factors governing military capital cases was a "quintessential policy judgment" for the legislature.
In rejecting this claim, the Court conducted an extensive excursus into the
history of military capital punishment in England." The excursus, though
learned, was irrelevant." If there was one thing the Framers sought to avoid, it
was to create their Executive in the image of the English King. What is clear,
however, is the Court's reaffirmation of the principle that there are no inherently nondelegable functions. The Court had so ruled with regard to the taxing
power,32 Loving holds the same for the power to govern the military, including
rules for capital punishment. "This power," says the Court, "is no less plenary

22. 116 S. Ct. 1737 (1996).
23.
24.
25.
26.

116 S. Ct. 1730 (1996).
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1741-42.
See id. at 1742.

27. See id. at 1750.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See id. at 1742.
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl.14.
See Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1744-47.
This point was stressed in the concurring opinions of Justices Scalia and Thomas. See id,at 1752

(Scalia, J.,
concurring); id. at 1753 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
32. See Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212 (1989).
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than other Article I powers... and we discern no reasons why Congress
should have less capacity to make measured and appropriate delegations of this
power than of any other..... ."
Loving pushes the Court's post-1935 abnegation on delegation to the edge.
The Court holds that, despite the "intelligible principle" requirement, 4 the
Loving delegation was valid even though Congress provided no principle (intelligible or otherwise) telling the President how to select aggravating factors. In
fact; Loving indicates, no such guidance was needed, given the nature of the
delegation and the officer who exercises the delegated authority. 35 The implication is that no standard - not even an "intelligible principle" - is needed for a
delegation to the President, particularly when it involves his duties as Commander in Chief. Indeed, the Court goes so far as to assert, "It is hard to deem
lawless a delegation giving the President broad discretion to prescribe rules on
this subject."36
Administrative law heresy perhaps - but it fits in with the dominant
theme of the Rehnquist Court jurisprudence vis-A-vis Presidential power.37
In the other administrative law decision to be discussed, Smiley v. Citibank
(South Dakota), NA.," the Court carried the Chevron doctrine of deference to
statutory interpretations by administrative agencies 39 to an almost ridiculous
extreme. Under Smiley, Chevron deference even applies where the agency gives
a statutory term a meaning different from that in any dictionary. An 1864 federal statute provided that a national bank may charge its loan customers "interest
at the rate allowed by the laws of the State... where the bank is located."'
The Comptroller of the Currency issued a regulation that included flat late fees
that banks charged credit card holders in the definition of "interest."'" This is
contrary to the meaning of the word in all dictionaries, which uniformly define
"interest" as "Money paid for the use of money lent (1) (the principal), or for
forbearance of a debt, according to a fixed ratio (rate per cent)," -- - a meaning that it has had since a 1545 statute, which prohibited "interest... above the
sum of tenne pounds in the hundred."'43
Despite this, Smiley held that Chevron deference required the
Comptroller's interpretation to be upheld as a reasonable one. According to
Smiley, "the question before us is not whether it represents the best interpreta-

33. Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1748.
34. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
35. See Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1748.
36. Id. at 1751.
37. See, e.g., Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During 1994, 47 ADEmN. L. REv. 355, 364
(1995).
38. 116 S. Ct. 1730 (1996).
39. See Chevron USA Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
40. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1994).
41. See Smiley, 116 S. Ct. at 1732.
42. 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICIIONARY 394 (1970). See also WEBSTER'S TRD NEw INTERNATIONAL
DICToNARY 1178 (1981); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 993 (1987).
43. 5 OXFORD, supra note 42, at 394 (quoting 37 Henry VIII, C.9, § 3).
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tion of the statute, but whether it represents a reasonable one. The answer is
obviously yes."'
To the contrary, what the agency did here calls to mind a statement some
years ago by the Chief Justice: "Congress did not empower the Administrator
[to act] after the manner of Humpty Dumpty in Through the Looking Glass."4
It is hard to support an interpretation of Chevron that would require the courts
to uphold an agency that followed the Lewis Carroll method.
I don't usually nit-pick Supreme Court opinions, but I was intrigued by
Smiley's citation of contemporary law dictionaries and a Supreme Court opinion
to support the Comptroller's definition. The authorities cited by Smiley do not
really support the decision there. It quotes the definition in Brown v.
Hiatts,'--"Interestis the compensation allowed by law, or fixed by the parties, for the use or forbearance of money or as damages for its detention."--but
neglects to point out that this statement was made with reference to a loan that
called for "interest at the rate of twenty per cent a year."'47 Similarly, the law
dictionaries cited do not support the decision. Thus, the Smiley quote from
Bouvier," the standard American law dictionary of its day, is similar to that in
Brown v. Hiatts, but again the Court's opinion does not mention that, in its
discussion of how interest is computed, Bouvier makes reference only to interest as a percentage of principal. In particular, it lists the rate of interest allowed
in the different states, all stated in percentage terms. Burrill's Law Dictionary
and the Encyclopedia of Law cited by the Court49 contain general definitions
similar to that in Bouvier, but that alone scarcely endorses the Smiley definition-especially since the Encyclopedia also later lists the rate allowed in the
different states as only a percentage of principal.50 Equally important is the
fact that the leading English law dictionary of the day defined "interest" as "the
rate per cent."' In addition, the leading American dictionary when the 1864
federal statute was passed defined "interest" as "Premium paid for the use of
'
money; the profit per cent derived from money lent."52
It is hard to see how the Comptroller of the Currency's definition is reasonable when it is contrary as it is to all the dictionary meanings of the word.
After all, as a famous Lincoln remark put it, "If you call a tail a leg, that don't
' Under Smiley, however, if an agency calls a tail a leg, the tail
make it a leg."53
apparently does become a leg. Of course, the broader question in our public law

44.
45.
46.
47.

Smiley, 116 S.Ct. at 1735.
Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 283 (1978).
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 177 (1873).
Id. at 185.

48. JOHN BOUVIER, LAW DICIONARY 652, 656-658 (6th ed. 1856).

49. See Smiley, 116 S. Ct. at 1735.
50. 11 AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 411-13 (1890).
51. WHARTON, LAW LEXICON OR DICTIONARY OF JURISPRUDENCE 391 (1860) (cited as "But see" in
Smiley, 116 S.Ct. at 1735).
52. NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTnONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 615 (1856 ed.).
53. BARTLEtt'S FAMIAR QUOTATIONS 458 (Morley ed. 1951).
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is another Humpty Dumpty query: "The question is... which is to be masterthat's all" 4-the administrative agency or the law?
THE REHNQUIST COURT IN ACTION

Looking at the 1995 Term more broadly, we can say that there was no
great surprise comparable to that which met Court aficionados on the first Monday of October, 1996, when the Justices assembled for the 1996 Term. The big
question then was whether Justice Scalia, who had grown a beard during the
Summer recess, would still have it on when the new term began He did and
so became the first Justice to wear a beard on the bench in over half a century.
However, anyone who has seen the portraits realizes that there is all the difference in the world between Justice Scalia's scruffy beard and the elegant one
worn by Chief Justice Hughes, the last Justice to wear one.
In fact, the Scalia stubble brings to mind one of the greatest judges in our
history, Charles Doe, Chief Justice of New Hampshire (1876-1896) - an eccentric who looked like anything but a Chief Justice or even any respectable
person. Doe wore the clothes of a country farmer5 6 He never shined his shoes
and wore the same Prince Albert coat for over twenty years5 7 Once, while he
was sitting in the lobby of Boston's leading hotel, he was taken for a tramp and
thrown out.5 If you have seen Justice Scalia's picture with a beard, you may
fear that that is going to happen again. (Lest it be thought I am being uncharitable to the Scalia hirsute appendage, I quote Tony Mauro's comment: "The
debate over his beard seems to fall into two camps: one side preferring to compare Scalia with Luciano Pavarotti, the other detecting more of a Dom DeLuise
look." 59)
Nothing like the Scalia beard, of course, happened to enliven the pre-beard
1995 Term. On the other hand, we can state certain things about the Court's
work during the term. The statistics prepared by Thomas C. Goldstein,' which
appear after this article,6' are of great help in this respect. What we see from
these statistics confirms what we know from reading about the Rehnquist Court
and, above all, from reading its opinions.
First of all, we know that this is a Court that, compared to its predecessors,
is doing relatively little work. During the 1995 Term, the Court disposed of
only 85 cases. Even a century ago, the Court disposed of far more cases. It will
be said to this that the Court caseload was much lighter in those days. That

54. BARTLa'S FAILIAR QuOTATIONs 519 (16th ed. 1992).
55. See Tony Mauro, High Court Highs and Lows, LEGAL TIMEs, Dec. 23, 1996, at 11.
56. See Note, Doe of New Hampshire: Reflections on a Nineteenth Century Judge, 63 HARV. L. REV.
513, 519 (1950).
57. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMEIucAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 123 (1988).

58.
59.
60.
61.

JOHN PHIuP REID, CHEF JUSTICE: THE JUDICIAL WoRm OF CHARLES DOE 167 (1967).
Mauro, supra note 55, at 11.
See Tony Mauro, The Man With the Stats, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 28, 1996, at 9.
See infra pp. 487-91.
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may be true as far as the docket was concerned; but it was not true of the opinions issued by the Justices. In fact, as then-Justice Rehnquist informed us in a
1973 article:
The number of signed opinions handed down by the 1889 Court compares
favorably with most later courts. With virtually no assistance from law
clerks, its justices managed to turn out 265 signed opinions during this
term. Now, with three law clerks for each associate justice and four for
the chief justice, the Court turns out in the neighborhood of one hundred
twenty-five or one hundred thirty signed opinions each year. I am willing
to treat this as being pure coincidence, rather than any reflection on law
clerks.62
It is, of course, a reflection not on law clerks, but on the Justices themselves.
One of the main reasons for the decreased case-load is the fact that the
Rehnquist Court is a more conservative Court and one of the essential principles on which Justices like the Chief Justice and those who tend toward his
view, and even the middle Justices such as Justices O'Connor and Kennedy,
operate is: do not disturb the operation of the system unless you have to. The
conservative judge feels that it is not the role of the Court to decide every issue. That is why if you go through the cases where certiorari has been denied
in recent years, you will find some very important cases. Indeed, Ernest
Gellhorn wrote an article in 1994, in the National Law Journalanalyzing some
of the cases the Court had turned down.63 Earlier Courts, particularly the Warren Court, would have jumped at the opportunity to decide some of those cases.
Justice Brandeis used to say that what the Supreme Court did not do was
often more important than what it did do.' One of the more important things
about the Rehnquist Court is that it is doing less in terms of cases actually
decided than any Court in a long time.
In the Court itself today, we, of course, see a severe fragmentation. There
are two wings: a so-called conservative wing composed of the Chief Justice and
Justices Scalia and Thomas, and a liberal wing composed of Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Then there is the middle-the swing vote-wing.
The key question about the Rehnquist Court is still that posed last year, based
upon James Simon's book on the Rehnquist Court, The Center Holds.6' The
book came out just after the Supreme Court made its great switch in cases like
the Lopez case limiting federal power' and a commentator
wrote, "the title is
' 67
just one letter off. 'It should be, The Center Folds.'

62.
63.
64.
65.
(1995).
66.
67.
1995, at

BERNARD ScHwARTz,DECISION: How THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES CASES 260 (1996).
See Ernest Gellhom, Supreme CourtDocket Skirts Critical Issues, NAT'L L.J.,
Dec. 5, 1994, at A21.
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 71 (1986).
JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE THE REHNQUIST COURT
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
Tony Mauro, Tug of War In the 1994-1995 Term; Can the Center Hold, LEGAL TIMES, July 31,
A23.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol32/iss3/8

8

1997]

Schwartz: Federalism, Administrative Law, and the Rehnquist Court in Action

THE REHNQUIST COURT IN ACTION

These are still the big questions this year.68 Did the center hold? Did the
center fold? Were the decisions of the court liberal? Were the decisions of the
court conservative?
The answer to all of the above is, "Yes." Depending on what cases you
look at, the reason the answer is "Yes" is because the key votes are now those
of the two center Justices. In the Court, "the critical battle continues to be for
the minds and votes of the two pivotal Justices, Justices Anthony Kennedy and
Sandra Day O'Connor."69 We can see from the Goldstein statistics that, in the
close cases, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor were with the majority most of the
time. In the 16 cases decided by 5-4 votes, Justice Kennedy was in the majority
in 13 of those cases, and Justice O'Connor in 12.70 How the two have voted
has been the key to a working majority. If one wing or another gets the votes
of Justices O'Connor and/or Kennedy, that is usually enough to give them a
majority and the two swing back and forth. It reminds one of the early days of
the Warren Court just after Justice Potter Stewart was appointed. The Court was
then often divided 4-4 and Stewart's votes decided many important cases for
four years, until Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker retired and Chief Justice
Warren obtained a working majority.71
That is apparently the way it is going to be in the Rehnquist Court until
new appointments are made. Those appointments will undoubtedly be determinative, but it is all but impossible to predict them now. There are three Justices
who would probably like to retire, but whether they will do so in the second
Clinton term is something we really do not know. The Chief Justice would like
to retire; he wants to devote himself, it is said, to his writing. Justice Stevens,
the oldest member of the Court and the longest serving is, it is rumored, also
ready to retire and at least one other Justice may want to retire. But they are all
fearful of who their successors will be. If the President in the next few years
has the opportunity to appoint new Justices, particularly to replace the Chief
Justice, that will, as Robert Frost once said "make all the difference." But we
are clearly in a transitional stage. In the Warren Court we had a flood-tide in
our constitutional law. The Burger Court saw a period that most people consider a receding one. In fact, the Burger Court, according to the statistics, was at
least as activist as the Warren Court. Indeed, if that is the criterion of activism,
the Burger Court struck down far more federal and state laws than did the Warren Court - 31 federal and 288 state statutes under Chief Justice Burger compared to 21 federal and 150 state laws under Chief Justice Warren.

68. See the Dialogue on the Simon book's theme in 40 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 855 (1996).
69. James F. Simon, Politics and the Rehnquist Court, 40 N.Y. L. ScH. L. REv. 863, 864 (1996).
70. See infra p. 491. See also David G. Savage, Opinions on Rehnquist: Views on the Chief Justice's
Impact are Still Mixed, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1996, at 42, 43.
71. See BERNARD ScHwARTz, SUPER CHmEF EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COuRT - A JUDIcIAL
BIOGRAPHY chs. 8-10. (1983).
72. See BERNARD ScHwARTZ, THE ASCENT OF PRAGMATSM: THE BURGER COURT IN ACTION 408
(1990).
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Under Chief Justice Rehnquist, there has def'Mitely been a turn to the right.
We should bear in mind, however, that though we call Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy centrist, compared to the Justices on the right toward the end of the
Warren tenure, they are more conservative and more willing to act on their
conservatism. What is going to happen in the Rehnquist Court depends on
whether its present trends, particularly the trend in favor of federalism (to me
the key development in the Rehnquist Court) will continue and/or intensify.
That will depend on the future composition of the Court. Unfortunately, we
know no way to make us privy to what is going to happen in the future.
Few authors are as rash as those who venture into print with attempts to
forecast coming Supreme Court developments. As a newspaper once put it, with
regard to the present writer's effort to predict future Court tendencies, "He
would be on much safer ground trying to forecast the winner of the 1958 Kentucky Derby, for which nominations have not even been made as yet." Perhaps all we can say with assurance is to repeat, with Albert Camus, "the wheel
turns, history changes." The Court's public law will continue to evolve, as it
has until the present, to meet the changing needs of the society it serves.

73. Editorial, The Court Confuses a Noted Professor,SHREVEPORT TIMEs, July 13, 1957.
74. ALBERT CAMuS, RESISTANcE, REBELLION, AND DEATH 71 (Justin O'Brien trans., 1st Amer. ed.
1960).
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APPENDIX
STATISTICS FOR THE OCTOBER
SUPREME COURT TERM75

1995

by Thomas C. Goldstein 76

INTRODUCTION

The following tables set out a series of statistics for the October 1995 Supreme Court Term. They are intended to give the reader a summary view of
how the Court disposed of cases, as well as the degree to which the Justices
agreed with each other. To be sure, the data is just a snapshot view, and cannot
replace serious study of the Court's individual decisions. In addition, there were
times when it was necessary to make judgment calls about whether the Justices
in fact agreed with each other, notwithstanding the labels (e.g., concurring in
the judgment) that accompanied their opinions.

GENERAL STATISTICS FOR OCTOBER TERM 1995

Dispositions
Cases disposed of after argument and by signed opinion

75

Cases disposed of after argument but without signed opinion

2

Cases disposed of by substantial opinion but without oral argument,
i.e., cases decided on the briefs

8

Total number of cases

85

75. Copyright © 1996, 1997, by Thomas C. Goldstein. These statistics appeared previously as Thomas
C. Goldstein, Statisticsfor the Supreme Court's October Term 1995, 65 U.S.L.W. 3029 (1996).

76. Adjunct Lecturer, Program on Law & Government, Washington College of Law.
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Unanimity
Unanimous decisions

28

9-0 decisions, i.e., full agreement on the judgment but more than one
opinion

10

8-1 or 7-1 decisions

9

7-2 or 6-2 decisions

17

6-3 decisions

4

5-4 decisions

13

4-4 decisions

1

Other arrangements

3

Judgments
Lower court opinions reversed or vacated

50

Lower court opinions affirmed

29

Lower court opinions reversed or vacated in part and affirmed in part

4

Original jurisdiction or habeas dismissed

2

Treatment of the United States
Record of the United States as a party or amicus curiae in cases disposed of
after argument and by signed opinion: Won 37; Lost 16; and Won in Part 1.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol32/iss3/8
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Voting Relationships
KEY: The following chart sets forth how often the individual Justices voted together or apart. Each "cell" shows
shows the relationship between two Justices, and includes certain information. The first line shows the number of cases that
the two Justices decided together. The second line shows three numbers: the first number is the number of cases the two
Justices were in full agreement; the second number is the number of cases the two Justices were in partial agreement; and the
third number is the number of cases the two Justices were in total disagreement. The third line shows the percentage of cases
in which the two Justices were in total agreement. Finally, the fourth line shows the percentage of cases in which the two
Justices were in both total and partial agreement. Thus, for example, in the "cell" for Justices Rehnquist and Stevens, they
decided 81 cases together, in which they agreed in full 38 times, in part 13 times, and not at all 30 times. Their full agreement in 38 of 81 cases is 46.91%. Their full or partial agreement in 51 of 81 cases is 62.96%.
Rehnquist Stevens
Rehnquist

81

O'Connor

Scalla

Kennedy

Souter

Thomas

Ginsburg

Breyer

83

83

83

83

82

83

83

38 13 30 65

Stevens

Souter

Thomas

78.31%

75.90%

74.70%

65.06%

78.05%

63.86%

56.63%

86.75%

87.95%

83.13%

78.31%

89.02%

77.11%

73.49%

81

81

81

81

81

80

81

81

38 13 30

44 14 23 33 15 33 49 13 19 52 17 12 34 14 32 56 12 13 53 19

46.91%

54.32%

40.74%

60.49%

64.20%

42.50%

69.14%

71.60%

59.26%

76.54%

85.19%

60.00%

83.95%

83

83

83

82

83

81

57 11 15 62

54.32%

68.67%

74.70%

73.49%

69.51%

66.27%

71.08%

86.75%

71.60%

81.93%

87.95%

86.75%

82.93%

79.52%

84.34%

83

81

83

83

82

83

1 10 61 11 11 57 11 14 55 11 17 59 11 13

83

63 10 10 33 15 33 57 11 15

54 11 18 46 15 22 68

75.90%

40.74%

68.67%

65.06%

55.42%

82.93%

53.01%

49.40%

87.95%

59.26%

81.93%

78.31%

73.49%

92.68%

69.88%

68.67%

83

81

83

83

82

83

83

83

8

6 44 14 25 41 16 26

62 7 14 49 13 19 62 11 10 54 11 18

58 14 11 53 10 19 61

74.70%

60.49%

74.70%

65.06%

69.88%

64.63%

73.49%

62.65%

83.13%

76.54%

87.95%

78.31%

86.75%

76.83%

84.34%

84.34%

83

81

83

83

82

83

83

9 13 52 18 13

83

54 11 18 52 17 12 61 11 11 46 15 22 58 14 11

46 13 23 65 10

65.06%

64.20%

73.49%

55.42%

69.88%

56.10%

78.31%

80.72%

78.31%

85.19%

86.75%

73.49%

86.75%

71.95%

90.36%

95.18%

82

80

82

82

82

82

82

9 34 14 32 57 11 14 68

8

82

6 53 10 19 46 13 23

8 67 12

42.50%

69.51%

82.93%

64.63%

56.10%

53.66%

46.34%

89.02%

60.00%

82.93%

92.68%

76.83%

71.95%

68.29%

67.07%

83

81

83

83

83

83
9 13 65 10

82

69.14%

66.27%

53.01%

73.49%

78.31%

53.66%

77.11%

83.95%

79.52%

69.88%

84.34%

90.36%

68.29%

83

81

83

83

83

83

82

9 59 11 13 41

16 26 52 18 13 67 12

83

8 44 12 26

63.86%

47 1422 53 19

581510
69.88%
87.95%
83

4 38 17 27 58 15 10

56.63%

65.43%

71.08%

49.40%

62.65%

80.72%

46.34%

69.88%

73.49%

88.89%

84.34%

68.67%

84.34%

95.18%

67.07%

87.95%
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44 12 26 38 17 27

78.05%

53 11 19 56 12 13 55 11 17 44 14 25 61

Breyer

88.89%
183

78.31%

83

9

65.43%

65 7 11 44 1423

64 9

Ginsburg

9 53 11 19 47 14 22

62.96%

62.96%

Kennedy

14 54 11 18 64 9

46.91%

O'Connor 83

Scalia

7 11 63 10 10 62 7
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JuSTTCI-BY-JuSTICE STATISTICS

Opinion Authorship
Rehnquist

Majority
Plurality or

Stevens

10
0

6
1

1

22

O'Connor

8

Scalia

1

8
1

3

8

Kennedy

Souter

8
0

7
1

5

6

Thomas

Ginsburg Breyer

8
0

8
0

5
3

9

3

6

Plurality-like
Dissent (full
or partial)
I

I

I

II

Concurrence

4

7

3

9

5

6

5

7

4

opinTotal
ions authored-

15

36

15

26

18

20

22

18

18

Unanimous
Majority

1

3

2

5

4

5

2

1

2

Per Curiam or other unsigned disposition: 10

Dissenting Votes
Number of times each Justice dissented in full or in part:
Rehnquist
14
Stevens:
23

O'Connor

8

Scalia:
Kennedy:
Souter.
Thomas:
Ginsburg:
Breyer:

17
6
11
19
17
16

Number of times a Justice was the sole dissenter in a case:
Stevens:
5
Scalia:
2
Thomas:
2
All others:
0

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol32/iss3/8
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5-4 Decisions

5-4 decisions: 16 (this includes both the 13 cases in which the Justices split 5-4
in the judgment and 3 others in which they split 5-4 over a key issue in the
case)

Number of times each Justice was a member of a 5-4 majority:
Rehnquist
10
Stevens
5
O'Connor.
12
Scalia:
10
Kennedy:
13
Souter
7
Thomas:
10
Ginsburg:
7
Breyer.
6

Number of times particular 5-4 voting arrangements occurred:
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas:
7
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg:
1
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, Thomas:
1
Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg:
1
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer:
1
Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Breyer
1
Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer.
1
Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer
3
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